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ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court would not be required to make any 
"factual determination," it would simply clarify 
the meaning of its own Decree of Divorce. 
In part A(l) of her Argument, Ms. Hancock contends that 
the issue raised in the bankruptcy court is identical to 
that which Mr. Busch asked the trial court to address in the 
case at bar. Her explanation is that 
"both the [bankruptcy court's] oral ruling and the 
order [submitted to the bankruptcy court] indicate that 
the identical issue was presented to both courts. In 
order for the trial court to find that the second 
mortgage was, in fact, in the nature of alimony, it 
would by necessity, be forced to find that obligation 
was not in the nature of support for the minor child. 
This determination necessarily requires that the trial 
court revisit the issue of whether the obligation was 
in the nature of child support. Therefore, the trial 
court would conduct the same factual determination that 
had been previously conducted by the Bankruptcy 
Court."1 
Ms. Hancock is clearly mistaken. In the first place,• 
Mr. Busch is not asking the trial court to make any "factual 
determination." What he is asking the trial court to do is 
to clarify the meaning of its own Decree of Divorce. The 
trial court has already made its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Mr. Busch is not asking for those to 
be altered or amended in any way. The Decree of Divorce, 
xBrief of Appellee at page 12. 
however, orders Mr. Busch to pay the parties' second 
mortgage. It is beyond dispute that this obligation was 
intended by the trial court to be either part of the 
property division or an award of additional alimony.2 At 
trial, Ms. Hancock presented evidence and argument that Mr. 
Busch should be required to pay the second mortgage as 
additional alimony. There was no evidence or argument 
presented which suggested that the second mortgage should be 
treated as part of the property division. All that Mr. 
Busch is requesting is for the trial court to clarify its 
intent to grant Ms. Hancock what she asked for. 
Additionally, it is clearly not the case, as Ms. 
Hancock contends, that in order for the trial court to find 
that the second mortgage was intended to be additional 
alimony "it would by necessity, be forced to find that 
obligation was not in the nature of support for the minor 
child."3 To the contrary, Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the 
second mortgage can be additional alimony under the Decree 
2Ms. Hancock acknowledges that the trial court did not 
intend for Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the second mortgage 
to be additional child support: "...to call it child support 
would not be truthful. It isn't child support." (R. 721 at 
page 5, lines 26 thru 28) 
3Brief of Appellee at page 12. 
of Divorce and still be "in the nature of child support" for 
purposes of federal bankruptcy law. See, e.g., In re 
Sampson, 997 F.2d 717, 722 (10th Cir. 1993). In Sampson, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that 
Congress, by directing federal courts to determine 
whether an obligation is "actually in the nature of 
alimony, maintenance, or support," sought to ensure 
that section 523(a) (5)'s underlying policy is not 
undermined either by the treatment of the obligation 
under state law or by the label which the parties 
attach to the obligation. Thus, a debtor's lack of 
duty under state law to support his or her former 
spouse does not control whether an obligation to the 
former spouse is dischargeable in bankruptcy". 
997 F.2d at 722 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, clarification by the trial court that Mr. 
Busch's obligation to pay the second mortgage was intended 
to be additional alimony would in no way be inconsistent 
with the Bankruptcy Court's determination that it was in the 
nature of child support for bankruptcy purposes. 
II. The proceedings before the Bankruptcy Court and those 
before the trial court do not involve the same "bundle 
of legal principles." 
In part A(2) of her Brief, Ms. Busch repeats her 
contention that collateral estoppel is applicable because 
"the same factual determinations were before both courts." 
As set forth above, Mr. Busch is not asking the trial court 
to make any factual determinations; only to clarify whether 
his obligation to pay the second mortgage was intended as 
additional alimony, as was Ms. Hancock's position at trial, 
or was intended to be part of the property division. 
What Ms. Hancock fails to address is the fact that the 
issue before the Bankruptcy Court required the application 
of legal principles very different from those which would be 
required of the trial court in the case at bar. 
Accordingly, collateral estoppel has no bearing. See 
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 92 L.Ed. 898, 68 S.Ct. 
715 (1948); and State Ex Rel. Flowers v. Department of 
Health, 260 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 1978); Cf. Rhoades v. Wright, 
552 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1976) (a change in a governing 
statute or rule of court deprives a judgment based on a 
former statute or rule of its conclusiveness). 
The Sunnen case involved, inter alia, the Commissioner 
of the Internal Revenue's appeal from the Tax Court's 
decision applying res judicata to bar a challenge to the 
taxpayer's and his wife's treatment of royalties from a 
licensing contract which the taxpayer had assigned to his 
wife. In an earlier case between the same parties, the Tax 
Court concluded that the taxpayer was not taxable on the 
royalties paid to his wife during the years 1929-1931. In 
Sunnen, the Tax Court applied "res judicata to bar a 
different result as to the royalties paid pursuant to the 
same agreement during 1937." 333 U.S. 596. The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's ruling and 
United States Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, the 
Court found it "first necessary to understand something of 
the recognized meaning and scope of res judicata, a doctrine 
of judicial origin." 333 U.S. 597. The collateral estoppel 
branch of res judicata was explained in part as follows: 
That principle is designed to prevent repetitious 
lawsuits over matters which have once been decided and 
which have remained substantially static, factually and 
legally. It is not meant to create vested rights in 
decisions that have become obsolete or erroneous with 
time... It must be confined to situations where the 
matter raised in the second suit is identical in all 
respects with that decided in the first proceeding and 
where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules 
remain unchanged. If the legal matters determined in 
the earlier case differ from those raised in the second 
case, collateral estoppel has no bearing on the 
situation .... the legal matter raised in the second 
proceeding must involve the same set of events or 
documents and the same bundle of legal principles that 
contributed to the rendering of the first judgment. 
333 U.S. at 599-602 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in State Ex Rel. Flowers the Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin rejected a collateral estoppel defense where 
two separate proceeding involved the same facts, but 
distinct "bundle[s] of legal principle[s]." There, the 
defendant had been convicted of an offense, imprisoned and 
then paroled. His parole was subsequently revoked based in 
part on conduct arising out of an incident for which he had 
been criminally charged and acquitted. He appealed, arguing 
that his acquittal of the criminal charges barred the use of 
the conduct leading to the criminal charges in the 
subsequent parole revocation hearing under the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. The Wisconsin court rejected this 
argument. Citing Sunnen, supra, the court concluded that 
"[h]ere the ^bundle of legal principals' is not the same 
because different burdens of proof apply [beyond a 
reasonable doubt in the criminal case and preponderance of 
the evidence in the parole revocation hearing], and the 
paramount considerations are different." 260 N.W.2d at 734; 
see also Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67, 78 (1st Cir. 
1999)(the mere presence of a modicum of factual commonality 
does not establish the requisite identity of issues for 
purposes of collateral estoppel). 
In the case at bar, it is very clear that the "bundle 
of legal principles" contributing to the Bankruptcy Court's 
determination that Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the second 
mortgage is in the nature of child support is very different 
from that which the trial court would be required to 
consider. The issue before Bankruptcy Court was whether the 
second mortgage was a debt in the nature of child support 
entitled to priority treatment under 11 U.S.C. §1322(a)(2) 
or dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5). As set forth 
above, determination of that issue is a matter of federal 
bankruptcy law regardless of the nature of the obligation 
under state law. In re Sampson, 911 F.2d at 722. In the 
case at bar, however, the trial court would be concerned 
with a distinct "bundle of legal principles," including the 
child support guidelines set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-45-
7.14. Even Ms. Hancock acknowledges that the "bundle of 
legal principles" considered by the bankruptcy court was 
different from that which Mr. Busch is asking the trial 
court to consider: 
THE COURT: ... how would you characterize [the nature 
of Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the second mortgage] 
then? 
Mr. TYCKSEN: Your Honor, I believe if I were to try to 
characterize it from what this court would normally do, 
I couldn't do it because the, to call it child support 
[as the bankruptcy court did] would not be truthful. 
It isn't child support. To call it alimony would not 
be truthful either as this court would normally do. 
But in the application of Federal Law and Bankruptcy 
Law in that court as it's been applied over there, 
there are cases that say that if it has the effect of 
providing support to the family, i.e., maintaining a 
household with a dependent child and those kinds of 
things which is what the court found over there, then 
it is, in fact, [in the nature of child support and] 
not dischargeable. 
(R. 721 at page 5, line 21 thru page 6, line 8) 
Accordingly, collateral estoppel is not applicable. 
In part A(2)(b) of her Argument, Ms. Hancock also 
points out that state and federal court's have concurrent 
jurisdiction to determine issues of dischargeability under 
11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5). That is clearly the case.4 It is 
also clearly irrelevant for purposes of Mr. Busch's appeal. 
Mr. Busch has not raised any challenge to the Bankruptcy 
Court's rulings, jurisdictional or otherwise. To the 
contrary, Mr. Busch believes that the Bankruptcy Court's 
rulings were entirely appropriate as a matter of federal 
bankruptcy law. The Bankruptcy Court did not, however, 
purport to rule on, or otherwise make any finding with 
respect to, the intent of the trial court in the case at bar 
when it ordered Mr. Busch's to pay the second mortgage. At 
the risk of redundancy, Mr. Busch's duty to pay the second 
mortgage under state law had very little, if any, relevance 
to the Bankruptcy Court's characterization of that 
4See, e.g., Beckmann v. Beckmann, 685 P.2d 1045, 1049 
(Utah 1984). 
obligation for purposes of bankruptcy law. See, e.g., In re 
Sampson, 997 F.2d at 772. 
III. It was Ms. Hancock's burden to provide the trial court 
with an adequate record of the proceedings before the 
Bankruptcy Court. 
In part B of her Brief, Ms. Hancock argues that Mr. 
Busch "failed to present the trial court with an adequate 
record of the bankruptcy proceedings'7 and, therefore, "this 
court must ^assume the regularity' of the bankruptcy 
proceedings and conclude that the Bankruptcy Court decision 
was based on sufficient evidence regarding the nature of 
[Mr. Busch's] obligations."5 Mr. Busch has two short 
responses to this argument. First, Mr. Busch has neither 
challenged the "regularity" of the bankruptcy proceedings 
nor the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 
Bankruptcy Court's decision. Second, collateral estoppel is 
Ms. Hancock's affirmative defense. Accordingly, it was her 
burden, not Mr. Busch's, to provide the trial court with an 
adequate record of the bankruptcy proceedings. See 
Maoris & Associates v. Neways, 2000 UT 93, 520, 16 P.3d 
1214, 1219. 
5Brief of Appellee at pages 19-21. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Busch respectfully requests 
that the trial court's Orders denying his Motion for Order 
Clarifying Nature of Obligation and his Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation be reversed and that this case 
be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's decision. 
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